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STORYTELLING FOR OPPOSITIONISTS AND 
OTHERS: A PLEA FOR NARRATIVE 
Richard Delgado* 
INTRODUCTION 
Everyone has been writing stories these days. And I don't just 
mean writing about stories or narrative theory, important as those 
are. 1 I mean actual stories, as in "once-upon-a-time" type stories. 
Derrick Bell has been writing "Chronicles," and in the Harvard Law 
Review at that. 2 Others have been writing dialogues, 3 stories, 4 and 
metastories. 5 Many others have been daring to become more personal 
in their writing, to inject narrative, perspective, and feeling - how it 
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. J.D. 1974, U.C.-Berkeley School of Law 
(Boalt Hall). - Ed. I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Charles Church, Amy 
Scarr, and Orlando Cabrera in the preparation of this essay. A University of Michigan Story-
telling group of Heidi Feldman, Rick Pildes, and Sara Vance contributed innumerable insightful 
comments and suggestions. David Chambers, Michael Olivas, and Jean Stefancic read the manu-
script with the kind of care and attention that make them exceptional colleagues. 
1. See ON NARRATIVE (W. Mitchell ed. 1981); 1 & 2 P. RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE 
(1984-85); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Des Pres, On Governing Narratives: The Turkish-Armenian Case, 75 
YALE REV. 517 (1986); West, Jurisprudence As Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern 
Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 146 (1985) [hereinafter Jurisprudence As Narrative]; see also J. 
ADAMS, THE CONSPIRACY OF THE TEXT: THE PLACE OF NARRATIVE IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THOUGHT (1986); J. CAMPBELL, THE POWER OF MYTH (1988) (transcript of interview with 
Bill Moyers); T. LEITCH, WHAT STORIES ARE: NARRATIVE THEORY AND INTERPRETATION 
(1986). 
2. D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) [hereinafter AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; 
Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (1985) [hereinafter The Civil Rights Chronicles]. 
3. E.g., Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Race Reform Law: Will We Ever Be 
Saved? (Book Review), 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988) [hereinafter Saved?]; Delgado & Leskovac, The 
Politics of Workplace Reforms: Recent Works on Parental Leave and a Father-Daughter Dialogue 
(Book Review), 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 1031 (1988); see also B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN 
THE LIBERAL STATE 238-39 (1980) (dialogue between a disadvantaged and an affluent person on 
the notion of equal sacrifice). 
4. E.g., I NEVER TOLD ANYONE, WRITINGS BY WOMEN SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL 
ABUSE (E. Bass & L. Thorsten eds. 1983); Williams, A/chemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals 
from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 401-02 (1987) [hereinafter Al-
chemical Notes]; see also West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the 
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1985); 
Meisol, A New Genre of Legal Scholarship: Storytelling Feminist Takes on the Fundamentals of 
Law, L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1988, part V, at 8, col. 1 (quoting Robin West: "We need to flood the 
market with our own stories until we get [the] point across."). 
5. E.g., Bracamonte, Foreword: Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 297 (1987); Alchemical Notes, supra note 4, at 401. See gener-
ally J. GARDNER, THE ART OF FICTION 82-94 (1984) (defining and giving examples of 
metafiction). 
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was for me - into their otherwise scholarly, footnoted articles6 and, 
in the case of the truly brave, into their teaching. 7 
Many, but by no means all, who have been telling legal stories are 
members of what could be loosely described as outgroups, 8 groups 
whose marginality defines the boundaries of the mainstream, whose 
voice and perspective - whose consciousness - has been suppressed, 
devalued, and abnormalized. The attraction of stories for these groups 
should come as no surprise. For stories create their own bonds, repre-
sent cohesion, shared understandings, and meanings. The cohesive-
ness that stories bring is part of the strength of the outgroup. An 
outgroup creates its own stories, which circulate within the group as a 
kind of counter-reality. 
The dominant group creates its own stories, as well. The stories or 
narratives told by the ingroup remind it of its identity in relation to 
outgroups, and provide it with a form of shared reality in which its 
own superior position is seen as natural.9 
6. E.g., Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of 
Authority (Book Review), 68 B.U. L. REV. 217, 230 (1988); Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: 
Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 574-75 (1984) [herein· 
after The Imperial Scholar]; Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) (beginning article on rape 
reform by recounting her own rape); Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of 
Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 329 (1988); see also 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 
(1982) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Theory]; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the 
State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, 
Jurisprudence]. 
7. E.g., Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward A Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 
NATL. BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Johnson & Scales, An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven Rea-
sons Why We Sing, 16 N.M. L. REV. 433 (1986); Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowl-
edge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 14-16 (1988) [hereinafter 
Affirmative Action] (use of s. WEBB & R.W. NELSON, SELMA, LoRD, SELMA: GIRLHOOD MEM· 
ORIES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DAYS (1980) to explain civil rights movement and limits of liberal 
legalism in American Legal History class; use of an Alice Walker essay to explain rationale of 
compensation for wrongful death in torts class); D. Friedrichs, Narrative Jurisprudence and 
Other Heresies: Legal Education at the Margin 16-27 (Mar. 1988) (unpublished manuscript on 
file with author) (use of narrative forms, including biographies and autobiographies oflegal prac· 
titioners and scholars, in teaching interdisciplinary law and society class). Professors who teach 
in nonstandard fashion sometimes evoke strong reactions of rejection from their students. See, 
e.g., Bell, The Price and Pain of Racial Perspective, Stan. L. Sch. J., May 9, 1986, at 3, col. 1. 
8. By "outgroup" I mean any group whose consciousness is other than that of the dominant 
one. Cf Walker, Choice: A Tribute to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in IN SEARCH OF OUR 
MOTHERS' GARDENS 142 (1983); Affirmative Action. supra note 7, at 1 n.2 (term "outsiders" 
used to include those who are not white males and who are historically underrepresented in law 
schools); The Imperial Scholar, supra note 6, at 566 (nonwhites' exclusion from inner circles of 
civil rights scholarship). See generally M.-L. VON FRANZ, PROBLEMS OF THE FEMININE IN 
FAIRYTALES (1976). 
9. Des Pres, supra note l; see T. PETERSON, HAM & JAPHETH: THE MYTHIC WORLD OF 
WHITES IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 5 (1978); see also J. ZIPES, FAIRYTALES AND THE ART 
OF SUBVERSION (1985); A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Q. Hoare & 
G.N. Smith trans.feds. 1971); Levi-Strauss, The Structural Study of Myth, 66 J. AM. FOLKLORE 
428 (1955). 
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The stories of outgroups aim to subvert that ingroup reality. In 
civil rights, for example, many in the majority hold that any inequality 
between blacks and whites is due either to cultural lag, or inadequate 
enforcement of currently existing beneficial laws - both of which are 
easily correctable. For many minority persons, the principal instru-
ment of their subordination is neither of these. 10 Rather, it is the pre-
vailing mindset by means of which members of the dominant group 
justify the world as it is, that is, with whites on top and browns and 
blacks at the bottom.11 
Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for 
destroying mindset - the bundle of presuppositions, received wis-
doms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal 
and political discourse takes place. 12 These matters are rarely focused 
on. They are like eyeglasses we have worn a long time. They are 
nearly invisible; we use them to scan and interpret the world and only 
rarely examine them for themselves. 13 Ideology - the received wis-
dom - makes current social arrangements seem fair and natural. 
Those in power sleep well at night - their conduct does not seem to 
10. See, e.g., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2; D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND 
AMERICAN LAW (1981) [hereinafter RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW]; Crenshaw, Race, 
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1359 (1988); Saved?, supra note 3; Alchemical Notes, supra note 4. 
11. See, e.g., T. PETERSON, supra note 9; Bonsignore, In Parables: Teaching About Law 
Through Parables, 12 LEGAL STUD. F. (forthcoming); Des Pres, supra note 1; Freeman, Legiti-
mating Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme 
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) [hereinafter A Critical Review]; Lawrence, The 
Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 
(1987); Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for 
Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INEQUALITY 103 (1987) [hereinafter Taking Rights] (role of "Euro-
myths" in sustaining white domination); see also A. LoRDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984); Kennedy, 
Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 40 (D. Kairys ed. 1981); 
Steele, I'm Black, You're White, Who's Innocent?, HARPER'S, June 1988, at 45 (innocence-giving 
myths and accounts enable whites to be comfortable with things as they are). 
12. See AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2, at 5-7; w. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM 5 (1981) ("Stories are systematic means of 
storing, bringing up to date, rearranging, comparing, testing, and interpreting available informa-
tion about social behavior"); The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in A. 
LORDE, supra note 11, at 110; Cover, supra note 1, at 4-5; Saved?, supra note 3; Delgado & 
Leskovac, supra note 3; Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Storytelling, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 543, 550-52 (1988) (on the need to balance rhetoricians' search for belief and 
community against deconstructionists' suspicion); see also J. GARDNER, supra note 5, at 88; Tag-
liabue, Police Draw the Curtain, but the Farce Still Plays, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1988, at A4, col. 
3. 
13. See generally M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 
135 (1985); H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975); Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist 
Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 13 (1988); Saved?, supra note 3, at 929; Delgado & 
Leskovac, supra note 3, at 1039; Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 
1151 (1985); White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in ON NARRA-
TIVE, supra note l, at 23. 
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them like oppression.14 
The cure is storytelling (or as I shall sometimes call it, counter-
storytelling). As Derrick Bell, Bruno Bettelheim, and others show, 
stories can shatter complacency and challenge the status quo. 15 Sto-
ries told by underdogs are frequently ironic or satiric;16 a root word 
for "humor" is humus - bringing low, down to earth.17 Along with 
the tradition of storytelling in black culture18 there exists the Spanish 
tradition of the picaresque novel or story, which tells of humble folk 
piquing the pompous or powerful and bringing them down to more 
human levels. 19 
Most who write about storytelling focus on its community-building 
functions: stories build consensus, a common culture of shared under-
standings, and deeper, more vital ethics. Counterstories, which chal-
lenge the received wisdom, do that as well. They can open new 
windows into reality, showing us that there are possibilities for life 
other than the ones we live. They enrich imagination and teach that 
14. See supra note 8 (consciousness as the defining characteristic of"outgroups"); The Impe· 
rial Scholar, supra note 6; Saved?, supra note 3, at 926, 931; Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 3, at 
1050-54, 1058. See generally Levi-Strauss, supra note 9, at 428-29 (supporting the idea that 
myths are used by social groups to overcome contradiction -to feel comfortable with a reality 
that would otherwise be difficult to explain). 
15. See B. BETIELHEIM, THE USES OF ENCHANTMENT (1975); Kundera, The Novel and 
Europe, N.Y. REV. BooKS, July 19, 1984, at 15 (stories enable us to go beyond conventional 
interpretation; good storytellers subvert and deepen culture); Steele, supra note 11, at 45; Stone, 
The ReasonforStories: Toward a Moral Fiction, HARPER'S, June 1988, at 71 (stories essential to 
sense of self; fiction expands range of human possibilities); see also supra note 12. 
16. See, e.g., infra section I.D (the savage satire of Al-Hammar X); infra section I.E (the 
more subtle use of irony by the author of the anonymous leaflet); see also LAY MY BURDEN 
DOWN: A FOLK HISTORY OF SLAVERY 1-2 (B. Botkin ed. 1945); PUTIJN' ON OLE MASSA: 
THE SLAVE NARRATIVES OF HENRY BIBB, WILLIAM WELLS BROWN, AND SOLOMON NOR· 
THRUP 33, 46 (G. Osofsky ed. 1969) [hereinafter PUTIIN' ON OLE MASSA]; Arnez & Anthony, 
Contemporary Negro Humor as Social Satire, 29 PHYLON 339 (1968); Bell, The Final Report: 
Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 81 MICH. L. REV. 2382 (1989); Marshall, Reflections on 
the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987); Matsuda, Look· 
ing to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 
335-37 (1987) [hereinafter Looking to the Bottom]; Warren & Ellison, A Dialogue, REPORTER, 
Mar. 25, 1965, at 42; Taking Rights, supra note 11. 
17. J. SHIPLEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH WORDS 441 (1984) (humor derives from ugu, a 
word for wetness; related to humus - earth or earthly sources of wetness); see also THE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 452 (C. Onions ed. 1966). 
18. See THE BOOK OF NEGRO FOLKLORE (L. Hughes & A. Bontemps eds. 1958); THE NE· 
GRO AND HIS FOLKLORE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY PERIODICALS (B. Jackson ed. 1967); 
Greene, A Short Commentary on the Chronicles, 3 HARV. BLACKLETIER J. 60, 62 (1986); see 
also L. PARRISH, SLAVE SONGS OF THE GEORGIA SEA ISLANDS (1942). 
19. See, e.g., M. CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE OF LA MANCHA (W. Starkie trans.fed. 1954) 
(1605). For ironic perspectives on modern Chicano culture, see R. RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF 
MEMORY (1980); Lopez, The Idea of a Constitution in the Chicano Tradition, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
162, (1987); Rodriguez, The Fear of Losing a Culture, TIME, July 11, 1988, at 84. Cf The 
Imperial Scholar, supra note 6 (ironic examination of the dearth of minority scholarship in the 
civil rights field); Tagliabue, supra note 12 (Polish street theater group uses humor and irony to 
expose Communism's flaws). 
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by combining elements from the story and current reality, we may 
construct a new world richer than either alone. 2° Counterstories can 
quicken and engage conscience. Their graphic quality can stir imagi-
nation in ways in which more conventional discourse cannot.2 I 
But stories and counterstories can serve an equally important de-
structive function. They can show that what we believe is ridiculous, 
self-serving, or cruel. They can show us the way out of the trap of 
unjustified exclusion. They can help us understand when it is time to 
reallocate power. They are the other half-the destructive half- of 
the creative dialectic. 
Stories and counterstories, to be effective, must be or must appear 
to be noncoercive. They invite the reader to suspend judgment, listen 
for their point or message, and then decide what measure of truth they 
contain. 22 They are insinuative, not frontal; they offer a respite from 
the linear, coercive discourse that characterizes much legal writing. 
This essay examines the use of stories in the struggle for racial 
reform. Part I shows how we construct social reality by devising and 
passing on stories - interpretive structures by which we impose order 
on experience and it on us. To illustrate how stories structure reality, 
I choose a single race-tinged event and tell it in the form of five stories 
or narratives. Each account is followed by analysis, showing what the 
story includes and leaves out and how it perpetuates one version of 
social reality rather than another. Part II deals with counterstories, 
20. The process of creating that new world will not always be pleasant or easy, but sometimes 
full of challenge and tension. See Saved?, supra note 3, at 927 n.20, 947; Alchemical Notes, supra 
note 4, at 406-09; D. Friedrichs, supra note 7, at 4 ("[Stories] challenge taken-for-granted hierar-
chies both by exposing . . . the cruel consequences of such hierarchies, and by imaginatively 
promoting alternative accounts of how humans might live ... . ");see also D. HOFSTADTER, 
GODEL, EsCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 28 (1980); Rycroft, The Sixth Sense 
(Book Review), N.Y. Rev. Books, Mar. 13, 1986, at 11. See generally M. BALL supra note 13; 
J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973) [hereinafter THE LEGAL IMAGINATION]; J.B. 
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984) [hereinafter WHEN WORDS]. 
21. See Stone, supra note 15, at 71, 75; West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One 
Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 867, 875 (1988) [hereinafter Economic Man]; Jurisprudence as 
Narrative supra, note 1, at 145-46 ("When we discuss what is, we rely quite rightly upon descrip-
tion and analysis. But when we discuss what is possible, what we desire and what we dread, we 
quite naturally turn to stories .... "); Friedrichs, supra note 7, at 13. Cf Gabel, Phenomenology 
of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1563 (1984); 
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363, 1382-84 (1984). See generally J. GARD-
NER, ON MORAL FICTION 5, 15-16 (1978); G. ELIOT, The Natural History of German Life, in 
EssAYS OF GEORGE ELIOT 266 (T. Pinney ed. 1963). 
22. For discussion of this "willing suspension of disbelief," see Friedrichs, supra note 7, at 7 
(narrative form useful for conveying "heretical notions" because less "abrasively didactic" than 
other forms; readers willingly expose themselves to narrative accounts of outgroup figures). But 
note Bell's warning: Moses, Jesus, Plato, and Socrates all used stories to explain or challenge law 
and politics. Even so, the minority storyteller must balance tale telling with solid legal analysis, 
so as not to seem "too general and too devoid of legal theory for some of [his or her] academic 
friends." The Civil Rights Chronicles, supra note 2, at 82. 
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competing versions that can be used to challenge a stock story and 
prepare the way for a new one. Section II.A lays out in greater detail 
the case for counter-storytelling by outgroups. Section II.B addresses 
the questions, Why should members of the dominant group listen to 
the stories told by outgroups? How can they - members of the in-
group - benefit? 
I. STORYTELLING AND COUNTER-STORYTELLING 
The same object, as everyone knows, can be described in many 
ways. 23 A rectangular red object on my living room floor may be a 
nuisance if I stub my toe on it in the dark, a doorstop if I use it for that 
purpose, further evidence of my lackadaisical housekeeping to my vis-
iting mother, a toy to my young daughter, or simply a brick left over 
from my patio restoration project. There is no single true, or all-en-
compassing description. The same holds true of events. Watching an 
individual perform strenuous repetitive movements, we might say that 
he or she is exercising, discharging nervous energy, seeing to his or her 
health under doctor's orders, or suffering a seizure or convulsion. 
Often, we will not be able to ascertain the single best description or 
interpretation of what we have seen. We participate in creating what 
we see in the very act of describing it. 24 
Social and moral realities, the subject of this essay, are just as inde-
terminate and subject to interpretation as single objects or events, if 
not more so. For example, what is the "correct" answer to the ques-
tion, The American Indians are - (A) a colonized people; (B) tragic 
victims of technological progress; (C) subjects of a suffocating, misdi-
rected federal beneficence; (D) a minority stubbornly resistant to as-
similation; or (E) --; or (F) ? 
My premise is that much of social reality is constructed. We de-
cide what is, and, almost simultaneously, what ought to be. Narrative 
habits, patterns of seeing, shape what we see and that to which we 
aspire. 25 These patterns of perception become habitual, tempting us to 
23. See J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976) (words alter- do violence to - events or 
experiences); A Map that "Changes the World," San Francisco Chron., Oct. 14, 1988, at A3, col. 
1 (National Geographic adopted new "more realistic" world map that depicted United States 
smaller than previous map, Soviet Union and oceans larger; experts quoted as saying that no map 
is a "true representation of the world." "[A]n Eskimo cartographer ... might do something 
different."); see also Tagliabue, supra note 12. 
24. See, e.g., R. AKUTAGAWA, In a Grove, in RASHOMON AND OTHER STORIES 19 (T. 
Kojima trans. 1970); R. LEONCAVALLO, I PAGLIACCI (1892) (in the Prologue, hunchbacked 
clown Tonio explains that stories are real, perhaps the most real thing of all, turning com media 
de//'arte - "it's only a play, we're just acting" - on its head). 
25. See J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 175 (1985) [hereinafter HERACLES' Bow]; Stone, 
supra note 15; see also Cole, Thoughts from the Land of And, 39 MERCER L. REV. 907, 921-25 
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believe that the way things are is inevitable, or the best that can be in 
an imperfect world.26 Alternative visions of reality are not explored, 
or, if they are, rejected as extreme or implausible. 
In the area of racial reform the majority story would go something 
like this: 
Early in our history there was slavery, which was a terrible thing. 
Blacks were brought to this country from Africa in chains and made to 
work in the fields. Some were viciously mistreated, which was, of 
course, an unforgivable wrong; others were treated kindly. Slavery 
ended with the Civil War, although many blacks remained poor, unedu-
cated, and outside the cultural mainstream. As the country's racial sen-
sitivity to blacks' plight increased, the vestiges of slavery were gradually 
eliminated by federal statutes and case law. Today, blacks have many 
civil rights and are protected from discrimination in such areas as hous-
ing, public education, employment, and voting. The gap between blacks 
and whites is steadily closing, although it may take some time for it to 
close completely. At the same time, it is important not to go too far in 
providing special benefits for blacks. Doing so induces dependency and 
welfare mentality. It can also cause a backlash among innocent white 
victims of reverse discrimination. Most Americans are fair-minded indi-
viduals who harbor little racial prejudice. The few who do can be pun-
ished when they act on those beliefs. 
Yet, coexisting with that rather comforting tale is another story of 
black subordination in America, a history "gory, brutal, filled with 
more murder, mutilation, rape, and brutality than most of us can im-
agine or easily comprehend."27 This other history continues into the 
present, implicating individuals still alive. 28 It includes infant death 
rates among blacks nearly double those of whites, unemployment rates 
among black males nearly triple those of whites, and a gap between 
the races in income, wealth, and life expectancy that is the same as it 
(1988) (discussing theories that language determines the physical world, rather than the oppo-
site); White, Thinking About Our Language, 96 YALE L.J. 1960, 1971 (1987) [hereinafter Think-
ing About Our Language] (describing the dangers of reification). See generally N. GOODMAN, 
WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978); E. CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH (1946). 
I say "shape," not "create" or "determine," because I believe there is a degree of intersubjec-
tivity in the stories we tell. See infra sections 1.A-.E, recounting an event in the form of five 
stories. Every well-told story is virtually an archetype - it rings true in light of the hearer's 
stock of preexisting stories. But stories may expand that empathic range if artfully crafted and 
told; that is their main virtue. See infra Part II. 
26. See Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 
11, at 281, 286-87 (ascribing this seeming inevitability to unthinking adoption of belief systems); 
Kairys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 11, at 3-4. 
27. AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2, at 217. See generally RACE, RACISM, AND 
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 10, at 1-58 (chapter entitled Slavery and American Law); D. GLAS-
GOW, THE BLACK UNDERCLASS (1980) (examining the roots and ongoing causes of the black 
underclass). 
28. See Saved?, supra note 3, at 938. 
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was fifteen years ago, if not greater.29 It includes despair, crime, and 
drug addiction in black neighborhoods, and college and university en-
rollment figures for blacks that are dropping for the first time in de-
cades. 30 It dares to call our most prized legal doctrines and 
protections shams - devices enacted with great fanfare, only to be 
ignored, obstructed, or cut back as soon as the celebrations die 
down.31 
How can there be such divergent stories? Why do they not com-
bine? Is it simply that members of the dominant group see the same 
glass as half full, blacks as half empty? I believe there is more than 
this at work; there is a war between stories. They contend for, tug at, 
our minds. To see how the dialectic of competition and rejection 
works - to see the reality-creating potential of stories and the norma-
tive implications of adopting one story rather than another - consider 
the following series of accounts, each describing the same event. 
A. A Standard Event and a Stock Story That Explains It 
The following series of stories revolves around the same event: A 
black lawyer interviews for a teaching position at a major law school 
(school X), and is rejected. Any other race-tinged event could have 
served equally well for purposes of illustration. This particular event 
was chosen because it occurs on familiar ground - most readers of 
this essay are past or present members of a law school community who 
have heard about or participated in events like the one described. 
The Stock Story 
Setting. A professor and student are talking in the professor's of-
fice. Both are white. The professor, Blas Vernier, is tenured, in mid-
career, and well regarded by his colleagues and students. The student, 
Judith Rogers, is a member of the student advisory appointments 
committee. 
29. See CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, FALLING BEHIND: A REPORT ON 
How BLACKS HAVE FARED UNDER THE REAGAN POLICIES 4 (1984); J. SMITH & F. WELCH, 
CLOSING THE GAP: FORTY YEARS OF EcONOMIC PROGRESS FOR BLACKS xxiv-xxv, 81, 101-11 
(1986) (Rand report finding increase in black families headed by a female, in percentage receiving 
AFDC, and in number of black males unemployed or no longer looking for jobs); id. at 105, 108-
09 (gap between blacks and whites same as it was a generation ago); Saved?, supra note 3, at 931-
32 (discussing statistics); McLeod, Report Says Poverty Increasing for Hispanics Living in U.S., 
San Francisco Chron., Nov. 4, 1988, at A-4, col. 4 (family income for black and Hispanic fami-
lies, adjusted for inflation, decreased during past decade; poverty increased; gap between blacks 
and whites widened). 
30. See Saved?, supra note 3, at 931-32; Black Males Increasingly Rare in College, Washing-
ton Post, Jan. 16, 1989, at A7, col. I. 
31. See AND WE ARE NoT SAVED, supra note 2; Saved?, supra note 3, at 924; A Critical 
Review, supra note 11, at 1051, 1097, 1118. 
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Rogers: Professor Vernier, what happened with the black candi-
date, John Henry? I heard he was voted down at the faculty meeting 
yesterday. The students on my committee liked him a lot. 
Vernier: It was a difficult decision, Judith. We discussed him for 
over two hours. I can't tell you the final vote, of course, but it wasn't 
particularly close. Even some of my colleagues who were initially for 
his appointment voted against him when the full record came out. 
Rogers: But we have no minority professors at all, except for Pro-
fessor Chen, who is untenured, and Professor Tompkins, who teaches 
Trial Practice on loan from the district attorney's office once a year. 
Vernier: Don't forget Mary Foster, the Assistant Dean. 
Rogers: But she doesn't teach, just handles admissions and the 
placement office. 
Vernier: And does those things very well. But back to John 
Henry. I understand your disappointment. Henry was a strong candi-
date, one of the stronger blacks we've interviewed recently. But ulti-
mately he didn't measure up. We didn't think he wanted to teach for 
the right reasons. He was vague and diffuse about his research inter-
ests. All he could say was that he wanted to write about equality and 
civil rights, but so far as we could tell, he had nothing new to say 
about those areas. What's more, we had some problems with his 
teaching interests. He wanted to teach peripheral courses, in areas 
where we already have enough people. And we had the sense that he 
wouldn't be really rigorous in those areas, either. 
Rogers: But we need courses in employment discrimination and 
civil rights. And he's had a long career with the NAACP Legal De-
fense Fund and really seemed to know his stuff. 
Vernier: It's true we could stand to add a course or two of that 
nature, although as you know our main needs are in Commercial Law 
and Corporations, and Henry doesn't teach either. But I think our 
need is not as acute as you say. Many of the topics you're interested in 
are covered in the second half of the Constitutional Law course taught 
by Professor White, who has a national reputation for his work in civil 
liberties and freedom of speech. 
Rogers: But Henry could have taught those topics from a black 
perspective. And he would have been a wonderful role model for our 
minority students. 
Vernier: Those things are true, and we gave them considerable 
weight. But when it came right down to it, we felt we couldn't take 
that great a risk. Henry wasn't on the law review at school, as you 
are, Judith, and has never written a line in a legal journal. Some of us 
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doubted he ever would. And then, what would happen five years from 
now when he came up for tenure? It wouldn't be fair to place him in 
an environment like this. He'd just have to pick up his career and 
start over if he didn't produce. 
Rogers: With all due respect, Professor, that's paternalistic. I 
think Henry should have been given the chance. He might have sur-
prised us. 
Vernier: So I thought, too, until I heard my colleagues' discussion, 
which I'm afraid, given the demands of confidentiality, I can't share 
with you. Just let me say that we examined his case long and hard and 
I am convinced, fairly. The decision, while painful, was correct. 
Rogers: So another year is going to go by without a minority can-
didate or professor? 
Vernier: These things take time. I was on the appointments com-
mittee last year, chaired it in fact. And I can tell you we would love 
nothing better than to find a qualified black. Every year, we call the 
Supreme Court to check on current clerks, telephone our colleagues at 
other leading law schools, and place ads in black newspapers and jour-
nals. But the pool is so small. And the few good ones have many 
opportunities. We can't pay nearly as much as private practice, you 
know. 
[Rogers, who would like to be a legal services attorney, but is at-
tracted to the higher salaries of corporate practice, nods glumly.] 
Vernier: It may be that we'll have to wait another few years, until 
the current crop of black and minority law students graduates and gets 
some experience. We have some excellent prospects, including some 
members of your very class. 
Rogers: [Thinks: I've heard that one before, but says] Well, thanks, 
Professor. I know the students will be disappointed. But maybe when 
the committee considers visiting professors later in the season it will be 
able to find a professor of color who meets its standards and fits our 
needs. 
Vernier: We'll try our best. Although you should know that some 
of us believe that merely shuffling the few minorities in teaching from 
one school to another does nothing to expand the pool. And once they 
get here, it's hard to say no if they express a desire to stay on. 
Rogers: [Thinks: That's a lot like tenure. How ironic; there are 
certain of your colleagues we would love to get rid of, too. But says] 
Well, thanks, Professor. I've got to get to class. I still wish the vote 
had come out otherwise. Our student committee is preparing a list of 
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minority candidates that we would like to see considered. Maybe 
you'll find one or more of them worthy of teaching here. 
Vernier: Judith, believe me, there is nothing that would please me 
more. 
* * * 
In the above dialogue, Professor Vernier's account represents the 
stock story - the one the institution collectively forms and tells about 
itself. 32 This story picks and chooses from among the available facts 
to present a picture of what happened: an account that justifies the 
world as it is. It emphasizes the school's benevolent motivation ("look 
how hard we're trying") and good faith. 33 It stresses stability and the 
avoidance of risks. It measures the black candidate through the prism 
of preexisting, well-agreed-upon criteria of conventional scholarship 
and teaching. 34 Given those standards, it purports to be scrupulously 
meritocratic and fair; Henry would have been hired had he measured 
up. No one raises the possibility that the merit criteria employed in 
judging Henry are themselves debatable, chosen - not inevitable. No 
one, least of all Vernier, calls attention to the way in which merit func-
tions to conceal the contingent connection between institutional power 
and the things rated. 
There is also little consideration of the possibility that Henry's 
presence on the faculty might have altered the institution's character, 
helped introduce a different prism and different criteria for selecting 
future candidates. 35 The account is highly procedural - it empha-
sizes that Henry got a full, careful hearing - rather than substantive: 
a black was rejected.36 It emphasizes certain "facts" without examin-
32. Compare this stock story with the larger one, of which it is a part, supra text accompany-
ing note 27. Cf THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 20, at 299-304 (discussing ways institu-
tions talk about people). 
33. See Saved?, supra note 3, at 936 (discussing Supreme Court decisions that require intent 
and tight chains of causation for discrimination to be actionable). 
34. Feminists have argued that the Jaw is essentially a male instrument and that male-
normed criteria of excellence operate to injure women in tenure and promotion decisions and on 
Jaw school examinations. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on 
a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 44 (1985); Polan, Toward a Theory of 
Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 11, at 299; Taub & Schneider, Per-
spectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LA w, supra note 
11, at 117. 
35. That is to say, the faculty would be a different collectivity with the addition of an articu-
late and outspoken black, unless of course his voice was silenced by peer pressure or hostility. 
Compare Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty, discussed in G. ZuKAV, THE DANCING Wu LI 
MASTERS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW PHYSICS 133-36 (1979). 
36. See The Imperial Scholar, supra note 6, at 568 (emphasis on procedure in "imperial" 
scholarship). In former times, powerful whites used substantive myths, stories about blacks' pur-
ported actual inferiority, to justify oppression. Delgado, Bradley, Burkenroad, Chavez, Doering, 
Lardiere, Reeves, Smith & Windhausen, Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity of 
Governmental Restrictions on Race-IQ Research, 31 UCLA L. REV. 128 (1983); cf Buck v. Bell, 
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ing their truth - namely, that the pool is very small, that good minor-
ity candidates have many choices, and that the appropriate view is the 
long view; haste makes waste. 31 
The dominant fact about this first story, however, is its seeming 
neutrality. It scrupulously avoids issues of blame or responsibility. 
Race played no part in the candidate's rejection; indeed the school 
leaned over backwards to accommodate him. A white candidate with 
similar credentials would not have made it as far as Henry did. The 
story comforts and soothes. 38 And Vernier's sincerity makes him an 
effective apologist for his system. 39 
Vernier's story is also deeply coercive, although the coercion is dis-
guised. Judith was aware of it but chose not to confront it directly; 
Vernier holds all the cards. He pressures her to go along with the 
institution's story by threatening her prospects at the same time that 
he flatters her achievements. A victim herself, she is invited to take on 
and share the consciousness of her oppressor. She does not accept 
Vernier's story, but he does slip a few doubts through cracks in her 
armor. The professor's story shows how forceful and repeated story-
telling can perpetuate a particular view of reality. Naturally, the stock 
story is not the only one that can be told. By emphasizing other events 
and giving them slightly different interpretations, a quite different pic-
ture can be made to emerge. 40 
B. The Same Event Told by John Henry 
Scene. John Henry has just received his rejection letter from the 
head of the appointments committee. The letter is quite cheerful. It 
tells Henry how much the faculty enjoyed meeting him and hearing 
his presentation on trends in civil rights litigation. It advises him that 
because of curricular concerns, the school's prime emphasis this year 
will be on filling slots in the Commercial Law and Corporations area. 
It concludes by encouraging Henry to remain in contact with the 
274 U.S. 200 (1927) (permitting states to sterilize the "feeble-minded"). Today, racial myths 
take a procedural tum - remediation must be deliberate, a backlash by "innocent" whites must 
be avoided at all costs, some remedies constitute "reverse discrimination," and tight standing and 
causation requirements are reasonable when a black sues for redress. 
37. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
38. It may be argued that Henry's story, which follows, and the two counterstories also 
soothe and comfort those of the storyteller's persuasion. See HERACLES' Bow, supra note 25, at 
171. 
39. See Denvir, Justice Brennan, Justice Rehnquist, and Free Speech, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 
285, 288-89 (1985) (liberals' sincerity key ingredient in their ability to justify their position). 
40. See Thinking About Our Language, supra note 25, at 1963-64 (legal hearings designed to 
test different versions of language). 
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school and wishes him luck in his search for a teaching position. It 
nowhere tells him that he has been rejected. 
A few days after receiving the letter, John Henry is having lunch 
with a junior colleague from the Fund. The colleague, who is also 
black, wants to teach some day and so quizzes Henry about his exper-
iences in interviewing at school X. 
Henry: It was, how shall I put it? Worse than I hoped but better 
than I feared. I'm not going to get an offer, although they of course 
never came right out and said so. And, from what I saw I'm not sure I 
would want to teach there, even if I had gotten one. If school X is any 
sample of what blacks can expect in this supposedly colorblind, eru-
dite world of legal education, I think I prefer Howard, where, inciden-
tally, I'm interviewing next week. I got more than a whiff of these 
attitudes when I went to law school almost 15 years ago, but I had 
dared to hope that things might have changed in the interim. They 
haven't. 
Junior colleague: But how did they treat you? Did you give a 
colloquium? 
Henry: You bet I gave a colloquium, and that's where it began. A 
good half of the faculty looked bored or puzzled and asked no ques-
tions. A quarter jumped down my throat after I had spoken maybe 
ten minutes, wanting to know whether I would advocate the same ap-
proach if the plaintiff were white and the defendant black. The old 
"neutral principles" idea,41 thirty years later. In the question-and-an-
swer period, several younger professors tried to rescue me; one even 
changed the subject and asked about my philosophy of teaching. That 
brought everybody to the edge of their chairs. I got the impression 
many of them merely wanted assurance that I would write some arti-
cles, even if they were mediocre. But they were all extremely con-
cerned that I be a good teacher. I think many of them were looking 
for a mascot, not a fellow scholar - someone who would counsel and 
keep the students in line, not someone who could challenge his or her 
colleagues at their own game. 
During the small-group interviews, many of them didn't even show 
up. The ones that did asked me about curricular matters, what 
courses I would like to teach, how I enjoyed going to law school at 
Michigan and whether I took courses from their friend, so-and-so, 
who teaches there. The few who asked me anything about my collo-
quium ignored what I had said but asked me questions based on recent 
law review articles, written by their friends, most of which, of course, I 
41. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 15 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
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had not read. They all seemed to deal with issues of equality, but none 
seemed to bear much connection to my work and litigation 
perspective. 
Several asked what my grade point average was in law school -
fifteen years ago, can you believe it! - and whether I was on the law 
review. They had my resume in front of them, so they knew the an-
swer to that perfectly well. The first two who asked seemed dumb-
founded when I said I had been invited to join the review and even 
more so when I said I had declined in order to work part-time in a 
prison law program. After a while I just answered the question by 
saying no. 
Don't get me wrong. They're a good law school; I could see myself 
teaching there. But I think they're looking for someone they will 
never find - a black who won't challenge them in any way, who is 
just like them. I tried telling them about the cases I have argued and 
the litigation strategies I have pioneered. Most of them couldn't have 
cared less. Their eyes glazed over after three minutes, or they changed 
the subject. 
Junior colleague: John, let me ask you something flat out. You 
don't have to answer this if you don't want to. You know that I prac-
ticed corporate law in a large firm in Atlanta for three years before 
coming to the Fund. I could see myself teaching business subjects 
some day, in addition of course to civil rights. The school you inter-
viewed at is advertising that they need professors of business law. Do 
I want to teach there? 
Henry: [Slowry] That's a tough one. If I went there, my greatest 
fear is that I would be marginalized and ignored - either that or co-
opted into the mainstream. I doubt they would see my work in civil 
rights as on a level with theirs in, say, property. You might have a 
different experience, though, teaching corporate and business law 
courses. Are you serious about applying? 
Junior colleague: I think so. 
Henry: Okay, my man. Let me call the Asian professor I met 
there. His name is Chen, I think. He seemed sympathetic, and I guess 
he would level with us. I'll ask him what he thinks the climate would 
be like for someone like you. Maybe in the process I'll learn some-
thing about how I was seen and get some pointers on how to conduct 
myself the next time I interview at a white, elite law school-if! have 
to. I think Howard is quite interested in me, and frankly I'm tempted 
to just accept an offer thei:e if they make one. It would simplify life a 
great deal. 
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Junior colleague: I would appreciate that. You're a good buddy. 
Let me know what you find out. 
* * * 
Henry and his younger colleague's story is, obviously, quite differ-
ent from the institution's story. Their story shows, among other 
things, how different "neutrality" can feel from the perspective of an 
outsider. 42 Henry's story emphasizes certain facts, sequences, tones of 
voice, and body language that the stock story leaves out. 43 It infers 
different intentions, attitudes, and states of mind on the part of the 
faculty he met.44 Although not completely condemnatory, it is not 
nearly so generous to the school. It implies that the supposedly color-
blind hiring process is really monochromatic: School X hires profes-
sors of any color, so long as they are white. In Henry's story, process 
questions submerge; the bottom line becomes more important. The 
story specifically challenges the school's meritocratic premises. It 
questions, somewhat satirically, the school's conception of a "good" 
teaching prospect and asks what came first, the current faculty (with 
its strengths and weaknesses) or the criteria. Did the "is" give birth to 
the "ought"? Henry's account, although less obviously slanted than 
Vernier's, contains exaggerations of its own. This is perhaps natural 
and understandable; Henry wanted his younger colleague to think well 
of him. His account is self-serving. For example, he implied that 
many of the faculty asked him about his law school grades, when in 
fact only two did. And, although Henry does struggle to free himself 
from the process trap to which Vernier succumbed, he does not suc-
ceed entirely. He charges that his "hearing" at the law school was 
substantively biased by racism and inappropriate criteria. But he also 
charges that the hearing was affiicted by ordinary defects: For exam-
ple, many of his hearers did not bother to show up - it was a mock 
hearing. Henry still accepts the system's dominant values, wants to 
play, and win, by its rules. Perhaps this explains the calmness, the 
tone of resignation about Henry's story. Whether this is because he 
42. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 138-44 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Marshall tells a "counterstory," in which a traffic barrier erected between an affluent white and a 
black neighborhood is put into a different perspective from that adopted by the majority. 
43. Vernier's story also patronizes Rogers; the professor treats her as some whites treat 
blacks. Rogers is temporarily a member of an outgroup. She has the potential to leave her 
student status and become like Vernier, but for now he and she are on unequal footings, an 
inequality Vernier exploits. 
44. Henry's narrative includes the details that: some of the members of the appointments 
committee appeared bored; that others asked paternalistic questions; that some faculty members 
failed to attend their own interviews of him; that a question uppermost in the minds of most of 
his interviewers was whether or not he would teach competently, rather than write brilliantly; 
and that his Civil Rights interests were peripheral. 
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has internalized some of his victimizers' consciousness, has a good al-
ternative coming up next week at Howard, or simply despairs of 
changing School X we do not know. But this situation soon changed 
drastically. 
Following Henry's lunch with his younger colleague, Henry tele-
phoned Chen and one other younger, bearded faculty member he met 
at the law school. The other professor, who is white, had visibly 
warmed up to Henry. He had asked him to call any time ifHenry had 
questions. As a result of talking with these two at length, Henry 
learns facts that leave him seriously upset.45 No longer resigned, 
Henry consults with several colleagues at the Fund about a lawsuit. 
After receiving an offer from Howard, Henry retains private counsel. 46 
The following two stories are the result. 
C. The Legal Complaint and Judge's Order 
1. The Complaint 
About a year after his unsuccessful interview, and ten months after 
speaking with Chen and the white professor, Henry files the following 
complaint in the superior court of College County of State X: 
Henry v. Regents, et al Comes now the plaintiff and alleges as follows. 
[Following various jurisdictional and exhaustion-of-remedies allega-
tions]: 8) That the defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful 
employment practice in that the defendant has discriminated against 
plaintiff by denying him an appointment as Professor of Law, because of 
his race and color; that defendant has denied plaintiff employment as 
Professor of Law because of his engagement in civil rights activities; that 
defendant has denied plaintiff employment as Professor of Law because 
as a black Professor teaching Civil Rights he would not "fit in"; and that 
the above mentioned acts of discrimination violate 42 U.S.C. section 
45. Henry learned: 
(i) That Professor White had delivered a vitriolic attack on his intellectual qualifications to 
teach law and had implied he would leave if Henry were hired; 
(ii) That another faculty member had purportedly obtained telephone information from a 
former co-worker that Henry "had a few skeletons in his closet"; 
(iii) That the faculty feared that someone like Henry could cause trouble by stirring up the 
students ("wouldn't be a good role model even for the minorities"); 
(iv) That the faculty had disliked his colloquium, finding it devoid of history, economics, or 
theory. It struck them as the talk of '1ust a practicing lawyer"; it was "too much like a brief." 
A desiccated version of Chen's account appears in the legal complaint that follows. 
46. Part of Henry's change of mood was caused by his belated realization that he (like Judith 
Rogers) was coerced. He was coerced, during his interview, to agree to be just like his interview-
ers. This was something he was unwilling to do; his rejection was the direct result. He resolves 
to reconstruct John Henry's story. But he chooses, because of his experience as an attorney, the 
familiar route of a legal complaint. Unlike Al-Hammar X (whose story is told infra section I.D), 
Henry has not yet rejected dominant values. In time, he may. He is still committed to reasona-
bleness - to telling measured, legal stories. 
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1981 in that they were based on race, color, and civil rights activities and 
orientations. 
9) That the plaintiff has lost wages by reason of the illegal employment 
practices of defendant and has earned less money in other employment 
than he would have earned had he received appointment as Professor of 
Law at defendant institution. 
Whereupon plaintiff prays that this Court find that the defendant has 
intentionally and illegally denied plaintiff employment because of his 
race, color, and civil rights activities, and because as a black man he 
would not "fit in"; that the Court enjoin defendant from engaging in 
these and similar practices; that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff 
all lost wages because of said unlawful employment practices; that the 
defendant pay plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees; and that defendant 
be ordered to pay all costs in this action. 
Phyllis M. Leventhal 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Address: 49 State Building 
Capitol City, State X 
2. The Judge's Order Dismissing the Action 
After a short period of discovery, the judge dismissed Henry's suit 
with a brief opinion: 
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is 
clear to this Court that he cannot prevail. Plaintiff has adduced no evi-
dence, save his own assertion that he was not hired, that he has suffered 
unlawful employment discrimination. Given the historic shortage of 
qualified minorities in the applicant pool, it is not surprising that white 
faces should preponderate on a law faculty. This imbalance is not irrele-
vant but by itself does not constitute invidious discrimination. It is of no 
greater or less significance than the proportion of blacks to whites on the 
school's athletic teams. 
Even assuming that he is qualified to teach at School X, Plaintiff has 
not made out a claim that his failure to be hired there is a product of 
discrimination. If he could adduce even one example of obvious discrim-
ination - for example, if he had been told that his lack of authorship 
disqualified him, but he could prove that some white faculty members 
had neither published nor perished - this would be a far different case. 
But there is no such smoking gun. Plaintiff believes he was blackballed 
as a potential "troublemaker," someone who might use his position atop 
the ivory tower to cry out against the university, to bite the very hand 
that had uplifted him. But a propensity toward disloyalty is simply one 
of the competing considerations in the hiring process, the weight of 
which our scales of justice shall not attempt to assay. There is, however, 
nothing intrinsically wrong with requiring a college professor to be true 
to his school. 
Nor do we find that differential standards were applied to Plaintiff's 
application. It may be that the law faculty devalued his potential contri-
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butions as a teacher and scholar of civil rights law. But a faculty is enti-
tled to make judgments that one class or area of study is more urgently 
needed to round out the school's curriculum than another. 
Moreover, this Court would be most hesitant to substitute its own 
standards for those of the professors who make up the faculty of X 
School of Law. The Law School is an eminent institution, one of the 
nation's finest. The decisions of such a body are necessarily judgmental 
and highly subjective. It is not an appropriate function for this Court to 
tell the faculty whom they should hire. That is a matter for their profes-
sional judgment, and short of manifest unfairness or illegality, this Court 
cannot and will not interfere. The factors that make a good law profes-
sor are many, subtle, and eminently professional in character. They are 
best made by those who, had he been hired, would have been Plaintiff's 
peers. It would ill serve the Plaintiff to force him on an unwilling institu-
tion. We find no actionable wrong. This case is dismissed. 
Both the complaint and the order dismissing it are stylized ver-
sions of Henry's story. Both use existing statutory and case law as a 
type of "screen" that makes certain facts relevant and others not.47 
Henry's lawyer struggled to present her client's story in terms a court 
would accept. She failed. Unless reversed on appeal, the complaint's 
story will remain a renegade version of the world, officially devalued.48 
Putting the facts in the linguistic code required by the court steril-
ized them. The interview was abstracted from its context, squeezed 
into a prescribed mold that stripped it of the features that gave it 
meaning for Henry. It lost its power to outrage. In a sense, even if 
successful the complaint would have legitimated the current social or-
der. As Comel West and others have warned, litigation and other 
seemingly revolutionary activity can serve this end. 49 Civil rights liti-
47. See HERACLES' Bow supra note 25, at 174-75; Milovanovic, Jailhouse Lawyers and Joi/-
house Lawyering, 1988 INTL. J. Soc. (forthcoming) (describing what gets "lost in the translation" 
when inmate jailhouse lawyers rewrite what happened in the streets into the language of the 
courts - a loss of the race-, class-, and sex-based inequalities that contributed to the inmate's 
dilemma, as well as such features as alienation, anger, and despair); Shapiro, In Defense of Judi-
cial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987) (judiciary's fidelity to facts and canons of fair argu-
mentation less than perfect); Bannister & Milovanovic, The Necessity Defense, Substantive 
Justice and Oppositional Linguistic Praxis 23-24 (1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) (screening function of legal rules). The screening function of formal legal standards 
sometimes benefits litigants of color by suppressing blatant racism and holding the participants to 
higher standards than they would otherwise display. Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, 
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 
Wis. L. REV. 1359 [hereinafter Fairness and Formality]. These advantages can cause minorities 
to place unrealistically high hopes on formal adjudication as a means of achieving social justice. 
Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed: Recent Books About the Deformalization Movement (Book 
Review), 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 145 (1988). 
48. See Cover, supra note 1, at 53 ("[j]udges are people of violence," whose object is to kill 
competing legal traditions); Thinking About Our Language, supra note 25, at 1963-64 (legal pro-
ceedings designed to pit different narratives against each other). 
49. See c. WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE! AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 
CHRISTIANITY 41 (1982). 
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gation also demeans, humbles, and victimizes the victim, draining 
away outrage and converting him or her into a supplicant. 50 
Stories do not pose these risks. Stories do not try to seize a part of 
the body of received wisdom and use it against itself, jiujitsu fashion, 
as litigation does. Stories attack and subvert the very "institutional 
logic" of the system. On the rare occasions when law-reform litigation 
is effective for blacks, the hard-won new "rights" are quietly stolen 
away by narrow interpretation, foot dragging, delay, and outright ob-
struction. 51 Stories' success is not so easily circumvented; a telling 
point is registered instantaneously and the stock story it wounds will 
never be the same. 
John Henry's complaint was doubly unsuccessful. It was dis-
missed, its failure validating the dominant story, its principal oppo-
nent so far. It also gave the judge an opportunity to tell his own story 
- dismissive, curt, verging on insult, and give it circulation and 
currency.52 
D. Al-Hammar X's Counter-story 
None of the above stories attempts to unseat the prevailing institu-
tional story. Henry's account comes closest; it highlights different 
facts and interprets those it does share with the standard account dif-
ferently. His formal complaint also challenges the school's account, 
but it must fit itself under existing law, which it failed to do. 
A few days after word of Henry's rejection reached the student 
body, Noel Al-Hammar X, leader of the radical Third World Coali-
tion, delivered a speech at noon on the steps of the law school patio. 
The audience consisted of most of the black and brown students at the 
law school, several dozen white students, and a few faculty members. 
Chen was absent, having a class to prepare for. The Assistant Dean 
was present, uneasily taking mental notes in case the Dean asked her 
later on what she heard. 
Al-Hammar's speech was scathing, denunciatory, and at times 
downright rude. He spoke several words that the campus newspaper 
reporter wondered if his paper would print. He impugned the good 
faith of the faculty, accused them of institutional if not garden-variety 
50. Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Equal Protection, 
12 SIGNS 421 (1987). 
51. See Saved?, supra note 3, at 396. 
52. How does a judge get away with this form of discourse? The answer must lie in our 
"story" of judging, what judges do. That story includes the function of scolding persons who 
have brought complaints we disapprove of - such as Henry's - and excluding them from the 
universe of "reasonable" complainants: John, like all the others, is an ever-complaining 
minority. 
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racism, and pointed out in great detail the long history of the faculty 
as an all-white club. He said that the law school was bent on hiring 
only white males, "ladies" only if they were well-behaved clones of 
white males, and would never hire a black unless forced to do so by 
student pressure or the courts. He exhorted his fellow students not to 
rest until the law faculty took steps to address its own ethnocentricity 
and racism. He urged boycotting or disrupting classes, writing letters 
to the state legislature, withholding alumni contributions, setting up a 
"shadow" appointments committee, and several other measures that 
made the Assistant Dean wince. 
Al-Hammar's talk received a great deal of attention, particularly 
from the faculty who were not there to hear it. Several versions of his 
story circulated among the faculty offices and corridors ("Did you 
hear what he said?"). Many of the stories-about-the-story were wildly 
exaggerated. Nevertheless, Al-Hammar's story is an authentic 
counterstory. It directly challenges - both in its words and tone -
the corporate story the law school carefully worked out to explain 
Henry's non-appointment. It rejects many of the institution's prem-
ises, including we-try-so-hard, the-pool-is-so-small, and even mocks 
the school's meritocratic self-concept. "They say Henry is mediocre, 
has a pedestrian mind. Well, they ain't sat in none of my classes and 
listened to themselves. Mediocrity they got. They're experts on medi-
ocrity." Al-Hammar denounced the faculty's excuse making, saying 
there were dozens of qualified black candidates, if not hundreds. 
"There isn't that big a pool of Chancellors, or quarterbacks," he said. 
"But when they need one, they find one, don't they?" 
Al-Hammar also deviates stylistically, as a storyteller, from John 
Henry. He rebels against the "reasonable discourse" of law. He is 
angry, and anger is out of bounds in legal discourse, even as a response 
to discrimination. John Henry was unsuccessful in getting others to 
listen. So was Al-Hammar, but for a different reason. His counter-
story overwhelmed the audience. More than just a narrative, it was a 
call to action, a call to join him in destroying the current story. But 
his audience was not ready to act. Too many of his listeners felt chal-
lenged or coerced; their defenses went up. The campus newspaper the 
next day published a garbled version, saying that he had urged the law 
faculty to relax its standards in order to provide minority students 
with role models. This prompted three letters to the editor asking how 
an unqualified black professor could be a good role model for anyone, 
black or white. 
Moreover, the audience Al-Hammar intended to affect, namely the 
faculty, was even more unmoved by his counterstory. It attacked 
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them too frontally. They were quick to dismiss him as an extremist, a 
demagogue, a hothead - someone to be taken seriously only for the 
damage he might do should he attract a body of followers. Conse-
quently, for the next week the faculty spent much time in one-on-one 
conversations with "responsible" student leaders, including Judith 
Rogers. 
By the end of the week, a consensus story had formed about Al-
Hammar's story. That story-about-a-story held that Al-Hammar had 
gone too far, that there was more to the situation than Al-Hammar 
knew or was prepared to admit. Moreover, Al-Hammar was por-
trayed not as someone who had reached out, in pain, for sympathy and 
friendship. Rather, he was depicted as a "bad actor," someone with a 
"chip on his shoulder," someone no responsible member of the law 
school community should trade stories with. Nonetheless, a few pro-
gressive students and faculty members believed Al-Hammar had done 
the institution a favor by raising the issues and demanding that they be 
addressed. They were a distinct minority. 
E. The Anonymous Leaflet Counterstory 
About a month after Al-Hammar spoke, the law faculty formed a 
special committee for minority hiring. The committee contained prac-
tically every young liberal on the faculty, two of its three female 
professors, and the Assistant Dean. The Dean announced the com-
mittee's formation in a memorandum sent to the law school's ethnic 
student associations, the student government, and the alumni newslet-
ter, which gave it front-page coverage. It was also posted on bulletin 
boards around the law school. 
The memo spoke about the committee and its mission in serious, 
measured phrases - "social need," "national search," "renewed ef-
fort," "balancing the various considerations," "identifying members of 
a future pool from which we might draw." Shortly after the memo 
was distributed, an anonymous four-page leaflet appeared in the stu-
dent lounge, on the same bulletin boards on which the Dean's memo 
had been posted, and in various mailboxes of faculty members and law 
school organizations. Its author, whether student or faculty member, 
was never identified. 53 
The leaflet was entitled, "Another Committee, Aren't We Wonder-
ful?" It began with a caricature of the Dean's memo, mocking its 
measured language and high-flown tone. Then, beginning in the mid-
53. Like all the stories, the leaflet is purely fictional; perhaps it was born as an "internal 
memo," stimulated by Al-Hammar's speech, in the minds of many progressive listeners at the 
same time. 
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die of the page the memo told, in conversational terms, the following 
story: 
'And so, friends and neighbors (the leaflet continued), how is it 
that the good law schools go about looking for new faculty members? 
Here is how it works. The appointments committee starts out the year 
with a model new faculty member in mind. This mythic creature went 
to a leading law school, graduated first or second in his or her class, 
clerked for the Supreme Court, and wrote the leading note in the law 
review on some topic dealing with the federal courts. This individual 
is brilliant, personable, humane, and has just the right amount of prac-
tice experience with the right firm. 
Schools begin with this paragon in mind and energetically beat the 
bushes, beginning in September, in search of him or her. At this stage, 
they believe themselves genuinely and sincerely colorblind. If they 
find such a mythic figure who is black or Hispanic or gay or lesbian, 
they will hire this person in a flash. They will of course do the same if 
the person is white. 
By February, however, the school has not hired many mythic 
figures. Some t~at they interviewed turned them down. Now, it's late 
in the year and they have to get someone to teach Trusts and Estates. 
Although there are none left on their list who are Supreme Court 
clerks, etc., they can easily find several who are a notch or two below 
that - who went to good schools, but not Harvard, or who went to 
Harvard, yet were not first or second in their classes. Still, they know, 
with a degree verging on certainty, that this person is smart and can 
do the job. They know this from personal acquaintance with this indi-
vidual, or they hear it from someone they know and trust. Joe says 
Bill is really smart, a good lawyer, and will be terrific in the classroom. 
So they hire this person because, although he or she is not a mythic 
figure, functionally equivalent guarantees - namely first- or second-
hand experience - assure them that this person will be a good teacher 
and scholar. And so it generally turns out-the new professor does 
just fine . 
. 'Persons hired in this fashion are almost always white, male, and 
straight. The reason: We rarely know blacks, Hispanics, women, and 
gays. Moreover, when we hire the white male, the known but less-
than-mythic quantity, late in February, it does not seem to us like we 
are making an exception. Yet we are. We are employing a form of 
affirmative action - bending the stated rules so as to hire the person 
we want.54 
54. See Fairness and Formality, supra note 47, at 1388-92 (prejudice flourishes in informal 
settings). I am indebted to my colleague, Mari Matsuda, for this observation. 
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The upshot is that whites have two chances of being hired - by 
meeting the formal criteria we start out with in September - that is, 
by being mythic figures - and also by meeting the second, informal, 
modified criteria we apply later to friends and acquaintances when we 
are in a pinch. Minorities have just one chance of being hired - the 
first. 
To be sure, once every decade or so a law school, imbued with 
crusading zeal, will bend the rules and hire a minority with credentials 
just short of Superman or Superwoman. And, when it does so, it will 
feel like an exception. The school will congratulate itself - it has 
lifted up one of the downtrodden. And, it will remind the new profes-
sor repeatedly how lucky he or she is to be here in this wonderful 
place. It will also make sure, through subtle or not-so-subtle means, 
that the students know so, too. 
But (the leaflet continued), there is a coda. 
If, later, the minority professor hired this way unexpectedly suc-
ceeds, this will produce consternation among his or her colleagues. 
For, things were not intended to go that way. When he or she came 
aboard, the minority professor lacked those standard indicia of merit 
- Supreme Court clerkship, high LSAT score, prep school back-
ground - that the majority-race professors had and believe essential 
to scholarly success. 
Yet the minority professor is succeeding all the same -publishing 
in good law reviews, receiving invitations to serve on important com-
missions, winning popularity with students. This is infuriating. Many 
majority-race professors are persons of relatively slender achievements 
- you can look up their publishing record any time you have five 
minutes. Their principal achievements lie in the distant past, when 
aided by their parents' upper class background, they did well in high 
school and college, and got the requisite test scores on standardized 
tests which test exactly the accumulated cultural capital they acquired 
so easily and naturally at home. Shortly after that, their careers 
started to stagnate. They publish an article every five years or so, 
often in a minor law review, after gallingly having it turned down by 
the very review they served on as editor twenty years ago. 
So, their claim to fame lies in their early exploits, the badges they 
acquired up to about the age of twenty-five, at which point the edge 
they acquired from Mummy and Daddy began to lose effect. Now, 
along comes the hungry minority professor, imbued with a fierce de-
sire to get ahead, a good intellect, and a willingness to work 70 hours a 
week if necessary to make up for lost time. The minority person lacks 
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the merit badges awarded early in life, the white professor's main 
source of security. So, the minority's colleagues don't like it and use 
perfectly predictable ways to transfer the costs of their discomfort to 
the misbehaving minority. 
So that, my friends, is why minority professors 
'(i) have a hard time getting hired; and, 
'(ii) have a hard time if they are hired. 
When you and I are running the world, we won't replicate this 
unfair system, will we? Of course not - unless, of course, it changes 
us in the process. 
* * * 
This second counterstory attacks the faculty less frontally in some 
respects - for example it does not focus on the fate of any particular 
black candidate, such as Henry, but attacks a general mindset. It em-
ploys several devices including narrative and careful observation -
the latter to build credibility (the reader says, "That's right"), the for-
mer to beguile the reader and get him or her to suspend judgment. ss 
(Everyone loves a story.) The last part of the story is painful; it strikes 
close to home. Yet the way for its acceptance has been paved by the 
earlier parts, which paint a plausible picture of events, so that the final 
part demands consideration. It generalizes and exaggerates - many 
majority-race professors are not persons of slender achievement. But 
such broad strokes are part of the narrator's art. The realistically 
drawn first part of the story, despite shading off into caricature at the 
end, forces readers to focus on the flaws in the good face the dean 
attempted to put on events. And, despite its somewhat accusatory 
thrust, the story, as was mentioned, debunks only a mindset, not a 
person. Unlike Al-Hammar X's story, it does not call the chair of the 
appointments committee, a much-loved senior professor, a racist. 
(But did Al-Hammar's story, confrontational as it was, pave the way 
for the generally positive reception accorded the anonymous account?) 
The story invites the reader to alienate herself or himself from the 
events described, to enter into the mental set of the teller, whose view 
55. For a discussion of narrative strategies to intrigue and beguile the reader, see THE LEGAL 
IMAGINATION, supra note 20, at 802: 
From the beginning you know where the lawyer wants to come out, and every word points 
that way ...• But the judge is bound to keep an open mind, to keep his reader in suspense as 
long as he can, if he is to express fairly the process of his decision. There is a difference 
between an opinion that reaches a conclusion and one that is aimed there .... 
. . . [I]f it is to express the process by which the original intention is worked out, the 
judicial narrative must keep the reader in a sort of suspense or open-mindedness, during 
which he is exposed one by one to the facts and arguments that seem important to the judge, 
until the reader has them all, at which point he should find himself agreeing with the judg-
ment. Very few opinions do this .... 
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is different from the reader's own. The oppositional nature of the 
story, the manner in which it challenges and rebuffs the stock story, 
thus causes him or her to oscillate between poles. 56 It is insinuative: 
At times, the reader is seduced by the story and its logical coherence 
- it is a plausible counter-view of what happened; it has a degree of 
explanatory power. 
Yet the story places the majority-race reader on the defensive. He 
or she alternately leaves the storyteller's perspective to return to his or 
her own, saying, "That's outrageous, I'm being accused of .... " The 
reader thus moves back and forth between two worlds, the story-
teller's, which the reader occupies vicariously to the extent the story is 
well-told and rings true, and his or her own, which he or she returns to 
and reevaluates in light of the story's message. Can my world still 
stand? What parts of it remain valid? What parts of the story seem 
true? How can I reconcile the two worlds, and will the resulting world 
be a better one than the one with which I began? 
These are in large part normative questions, which lead to the final 
two issues I want to explore. Why should members of outgroups tell 
stories? And, why should others listen? 
II. WHY 0UTGROUPS SHOULD TELL STORIES AND WHY OTHERS 
SHOULD LISTEN 
Subordinated groups have always told stories. 57 Black slaves told, 
in song, letters, and verse, about their own pain and oppression. 58 
56. E.g., HERACLES' Bow, supra note 25, at 94, 174; Note, Figuring the Law: Ho/ism and 
Tropo/ogical Influence in Legal Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 823, 843 (1988). On the theory that 
the force of narrative may be independent of the narrator, see THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra 
note 20, at 865-66 (possibility that whenever a story is told, it may take on a life of its own, 
escaping the writer's control and becoming an unshakable presence for the auditor). For a sum-
mary of major theories of persuasion, see J. SPROULE, ARGUMENT: LANGUAGE AND ITS INFLU-
ENCE 260-68 (1980). Sproule identifies three types of theories: Rhetorical Theories, Cognitive 
Consistency Theories, and Interpersonal Theories. Rhetorical Theories can be traced back to the 
Greek sophists, are typified by Aristotle's Rhetoric, are generally based on observations of public 
communication rather than on experimentation, and assume arguments should be studied not 
only for their effects, but for their ethics. Cognitive Consistency Theories (among the best-
known of which is L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957)) are experi-
mental and statistical and grounded on the tendency of the individual to move toward a coherent 
system of images by eliminating, reducing, or incorporating discordant new ideas. Interpersonal 
Theories consider the informal influences people have on each other. For example, the Balance 
Theory developed by Fritz Heider and Theodore Newcomb in the decade after World War II 
predicts that two persons who initially disagree over an issue will move toward harmony that 
may result in a unilateral change of mind, a purposeful ignoring or misinterpreting of each 
others' attitudes, or a changed relationship in which the disagreement becomes "consistent with 
dislike." 
57. All groups do. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9; sources cited supra note 16; 
Steele, supra note 11, at 47-48; cf Cover, supra note 1, at 49-50 (on the "interpretation of texts of 
resistance"); Tagliabue, supra note 12 (street theater used to expose Communism's flaws). 
58. Dorinson & Boskin, Racial and Ethnic Humor, in HUMOR IN AMERICA 172 (L. Mintz 
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They described the terrible wrongs they had experienced at the hands 
of whites, and mocked (behind whites' backs) the veneer of gentility 
whites purchased at the cost of the slaves' suffering.59 Mexican-Amer-
icans in the Southwest composed corridos (ballads) and stories, passed 
on from generation to generation, of abuse at the hands of gringo jus-
tice, the Texas Rangers, and ruthless lawyers and developers who 
cheated them out of their lands. 60 Native American literature, both 
oral and written, deals with all these themes as well. 61 Feminist con-
sciousness-raising consists, in part, of the sharing of stories, of tales 
from personal experience, on the basis of which the group constructs a 
shared reality about women's status vis-a-vis men. 62 
This proliferation of counterstories is not an accident or coinci-
dence. Oppressed groups have known instinctively that stories are an 
essential tool to their own survival and liberation. Members of out-
groups can use stories in two basic ways: first, as means of psychic 
self-preservation;63 and, second, as means of lessening their own sub-
ordination. 64 These two means correspond to the two perspectives 
from which a story can be viewed - that of the teller, and that of the 
ed. 1988); see Looking to the Bottom, supra note 16, at 347 n.105; see also sources cited supra 
notes 16 & 18. 
59. See L. LEVINE, BLACK CULTURE AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS: AFRO-AMERICAN 
FOLK THOUGHT FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 105 (1977) (trickster tales), 121-33 ("fooling 
master" tales), 298-320 ("black humor" to confront obliquely their oppressor, including jokes 
that mock hypocrisy, segregation, and integration); PUTTIN' ON OLE MASSA, supra note 16; 
Dorinson & Boskin, supra note 58, at 173; see also other sources cited supra note 16. 
60. E.g., A. LUCERO-WHITE LEA, LITERARY FOLKLORE OF THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 
(1953); Campa, Sayings and Riddles in New Mexico, U.N.M. BULL., Sept. 5, 1937, at 3. 
61. E.g., A GATHERING OF SPIRIT: WRITING AND ART BY NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 
WOMEN (B. Brant ed. 1984); R. ORTIZ, THE GREAT SIOUX NATION: SITTING IN JUDGMENT ON 
AMERICA (1977); Deloria, Indian Humor, in LITERATURE OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 152-69 
(A. Chapman ed. 1975); Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of 
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219. 
62. See FEMINIST THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY (N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo & B. 
Gelpi eds. 1982); A. LORDE, supra note 11; MacKinnon, Theory, supra note 6; MacKinnon, 
Jurisprudence, supra note 6; see also Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary In-
quiry into the Politics of Authenticity (Book Review), 68 B.U. L. REV. 217, 241-48 (1988) (critiqu-
ing various aspects of feminist consciousness-raising); Polan, supra note 34. 
63. See AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2, at 215-21 (Chronicle of the Slave Scrolls); 
see also Al-Hammar's story, supra section I.D, which seems to have been told as much as a 
mental health imperative as in hopes of swaying the audience. 
64. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text; Steele, supra note 11, at 47-49 (racial 
myths center about idea of innocence). Will whites listen to blacks' and other outgroups' stories 
- or simply "tune them out" or reinterpret them? See sources cited infra note 79. Some may do 
the latter, but others will not. (i) As was observed earlier, stories are often entertaining and not 
particularly threatening, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text; (ii) Stories benefit the 
majority-race listener, by enriching his or her reality, see infra section 11.B; (iii) Often it will be 
the majority-race individual who initiates the encounter, tells the first story ("What do you think 
of John Henry's not getting hired? I'm sure it wasn't discrimination, aren't you?") in which case 
he or she is obliged by the norms of social etiquette to listen to the black's counterstory. 
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listener. The storyteller gains psychically, the listener morally and 
epistemologically. 
A. How Storytelling Benefits Members of Outgroups 
The member of an outgroup gains, first, psychic self-preservation. 
A principal cause of the demoralization of marginalized groups is self-
condemnation. They internalize the images that society thrusts on 
them - they believe that their lowly position is their own fault. 65 
The therapy is to tell stories. By becoming acquainted with the 
facts of their own historic oppression - with the violence, murder, 
deceit, co-optation, and connivance that have caused their desperate 
estate - members of outgroups gain healing. 66 
The story need not lead to a violent act; Frantz Fanon was wrong 
in writing that it is only through exacting blood from the oppressor 
that colonized people gain liberation. 67 Rather, the story need only 
lead to a realization of how one came to be oppressed and subjugated. 
Then, one can stop perpetrating (mental) violence on oneself. 68 
So, stories - stories about oppression, about victimization, about 
one's own brutalization - far from deepening the despair of the op-
pressed, lead to healing, liberation, mental health. 69 They also pro-
mote group solidarity. Storytelling emboldens the hearer, who may 
have had the same thoughts and experiences the storyteller describes, 
but hesitated to give them voice. Having heard another express them, 
he or she realizes, I am not alone. 70 
Yet, stories help oppressed groups in a second way - through 
their effect on the oppressor. Most oppression, as was mentioned ear-
lier, does not seem like oppression to those perpetrating it.71 It is ra-
65. John Henry's state before talking with Chen was close to this. See supra note 60; F. 
FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1968); Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action 
for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 135 (1984); Wil-
liams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2128 (1989); see also A. GRAMSCI, supra note 9; Gordon, supra note 26, at 284-86; Steele, supra 
note 11, at 48. 
66. See sources cited supra note 62; Wiecek, Preface to the Historical Race Relations Sympo-
sium, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 407, 412 (1986). 
67. F. FANON, supra note 65. 
68. See AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2, at 215-21 (Chronicle of the Slave Scrolls). 
69. Id. 
70. For example, recall John Henry's lunch conversation with his younger colleague, supra 
text accompanying notes 41-42. See also E. NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE 
(1984); Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1336 (blacks' greatest resource the ability to speak and share 
experience of racism, to "name our reality"), 1349 (warning of danger of absorbing wrong sto-
ries, wrong reality). 
71. Supra note 14 and accompanying text; see Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical 
Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 309-10 (1987); see 
also The Imperial Scholar. supra note 6; A Critical Review, supra note 11, at 1054-55. 
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tionalized, causing few pangs of conscience. The dominant group 
justifies its privileged position by means of stories, stock explanations 
that construct reality in ways favorable to it. 72 One such story was put 
forward in the Introduction to this essay - the stock story of race 
relations in this country. 73 
This story is drastically at odds with the way most people of color 
would describe their condition. Artfully designed parables, chronicles, 
allegories, and pungent tales like the one told in the anonymous leaflet 
can jar the comfortable dominant complacency that is the principal 
anchor dragging down any incentive for reform. 74 They can destroy 
- but the destruction they produce must be voluntary, a type of will-
ing death. Because this is a white-dominated society in which the ma-
jority race controls the reins of power, racial reform must include 
them. 75 Their complacency - born of comforting stories - is a ma-
jor stumbling block to racial progress. Counterstories can attack that 
complacency. 
What is more, they can do so in ways that promise at least the 
possibility of success. Most civil rights strategies confront the obstacle 
of blacks' otherness. 76 The dominant group, noticing that a particular 
effort is waged on behalf of blacks, increases its resistance. Stories at 
times can overcome that otherness, hold that instinctive resistance in 
abeyance. 77 Stories are the oldest, most primordial meeting ground in 
human experience. Their allure will often provide the most effective 
means of overcoming otherness, of forming a new collectivity based on 
the shared story. 1s 
72. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text; see also West, Critical Legal Studies and a 
Liberal Critic, 97 YALE L.J. 757, 767 (1988); Steele, supra note 11 (innocence-giving myths vali-
date things as they are). 
73. Supra text accompanying note 27. This story is reassuring. There is little need for guilt 
or responsibility; we have all the case law and statutes that we need; black people have been and 
are making steady progress; and the few out-and-out racists that remain will be punished when 
they step out of line. 
74. See sources cited supra note 16 (underdogs' stories often ironic or satiric); Phelps, The 
Story of Law in Huckleberry Finn, 39 MERCER L. REV. 889 (1988); Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 
1335. 
75. See M. BALL, supra note 13, at 135-36; 1 P. RICOEUR, supra note 1, at x-xi; Crenshaw, 
supra note 10, at 1335-37, 1359, 1366-68; Saved?, supra note 3, at 943. 
76. Note the almost reflex rejection of Al-Hammar's story, for example. Supra section I.D. 
77. For illustration, note the serious attention given to the anonymous leaflet by faculty and 
the law school community. Supra section I.E. 
78. Stories may thus be the private-life analogue of formality in litigation and in the public 
sphere generally, namely, devices whose purpose and effect is to discourage and reduce prejudice. 
See Fairness and Formality, supra note 47. 
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B. Why Members of the Ingroup Should Listen to Stories 
Members of outgroups should tell stories. Why should members of 
ingroups listen to them? 
Members of the majority race should listen to stories, of all sorts, 
in order to enrich their own reality. Reality is not fixed, not a given.79 
Rather, we construct it through conversations, through our lives to-
gether. 80 Racial and class-based isolation prevents the hearing of di-
verse stories and counterstories. It diminishes the conversation 
through which we create reality, construct our communal lives. De-
liberately exposing oneself to counterstories can avoid that impover-
ishment, heighten "suspicion,"81 and can enable the listener and the 
teller to build a world richer than either could make alone. 82 On an-
other occasion, the listener will be the teller, sharing a secret, a piece 
of information, or an angle of vision that will enrich the former teller; 
and so on dialectically, in a rich tapestry of conversation, of stories. 83 
It is through this process that we can overcome enthnocentrism and 
the unthinking conviction that our way of seeing the world is the only 
one - that the way things are is inevitable, natural, just, and best -
when it is, for some, full of pain, exclusion, and both petty and major 
tyranny.84 
Listening to stories makes the adjustment to further stories easier; 
one acquires the ability to see the world through others' eyes. 85 It can 
79. Saved?, supra note 3, at 947; see Teachout, Worlds Beyond Theory: Toward the Expres-
sion of an Integrative Ethic for Self and Culture (Book Review), 83 MICH. L. REV. 849 (1985); 
Thinking About Our Language, supra note 25, at 1962. 
80. See sources cited supra note 10; J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 35 (D. Spitz ed. 1975) (we should 
accept as true only those interpretive beliefs that we have invited the whole world to prove un-
founded); Saved?, supra note 3; Shapiro, supra note 47. See generally N. DAVIS, FICTION IN THE 
ARCHIVES: PARDON TALES AND THEIR TELLERS IN SIXTEENTH·CENTURY FRANCE (1987). 
81. See Sherwin, supra note 12 (critical rhetoric can combine culture-building, constituent-
strengthening dimension of storytelling and "deconning" element). 
82. See sources cited supra note 20; M. BALL, supra note 13, at 135; Saved?, supra note 3. 
83. See sources cited supra note 74. Stories enable us to begin to reform thought structures 
by means of which we create our world - no small accomplishment. The task is akin to making 
a bed while still lying in it. Stories give us a glimpse of a world we have never seen, using the 
current stock of narratives to point the way to another better, larger, more inclusive one. But see 
supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (poorly told stories can result in rejection, rationaliza-
tion, or cognitive dissonance on part of listener and fail to have intended effect). 
84. See, e.g., the pain and anger in Al-Hammar's story, supra section l.D. Stories make 
belief structures visible and show that they need not be as they are. On the disjunction between 
majority- and minority-race life experiences and perceptions of the world, see Delgado, Critical 
Legal Studies and the Realities of Race - Does the Fundamental Contradiction Have a Corol-
lary?, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 407-08 (1988). See also Economic Man, supra note 21, 
at 873-77. 
85. See Affirmative Action, supra note 7, at 8. Note that Al-Hammar's explosive tale of rage 
and disgust may have paved the way for the more ironic and appealing anonymous account. 
Stories can often be staged, arranged in sequence so as to heighten consciousness incrementally. 
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lead the way to new environments. A willing listener is generally 
"welcomed with open arms."86 Listening to the stories of outgroups 
can avoid intellectual apartheid. Shared words can banish sameness, 
stiffness, and monochromaticity and reduce the felt terror of otherness 
when hearing new voices for the first time. 87 
If we would deepen and humanize ourselves, we must seek out sto-
rytellers different from ourselves88 and afford them the audience they 
deserve. The benefit will be reciprocal. 
CONCLUSION 
Stories humanize us. They emphasize our differences in ways that 
can ultimately bring us closer together. They allow us to see how the 
world looks from behind someone else's spectacles. They challenge us 
to wipe off our own lenses and ask, "Could I have been overlooking 
something all along?" 
Telling stories invests text with feeling, gives voice to those who 
were taught to hide their emotions. Hearing stories invites hearers to 
participate, challenging their assumptions, jarring their complacency, 
lifting their spirits, lowering their defenses. 
Stories are useful tools for the underdog because they invite the 
listener to suspend judgment, listen for the story's point, and test it 
against his or her own version of reality. This process is essential in a 
pluralist society like ours, and it is a practical necessity for underdogs: 
All movements for change must gain the support, or at least under-
standing, of the dominant group, which is white. 
Traditional legal writing purports to be neutral and dispassionately 
analytical, but too often it is not. In part, this is so because legal writ-
The stories told in Part I represent, if not a linear progression, at least movement - something 
more than simple oscillation around an undefinable midline. 
86. Id. at 16. 
87. Id. at 12-16. There are dangers in storytelling, particularly for the first-time storyteller. 
The hearer of an unfamiliar counterstory may reject it, as well as the storyteller, precisely be-
cause the story unmasks hypocrisy and increases discomfort. See Saved?, supra note 3; cf. R. 
LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 77-81 (1967) (double bind theory of schizophrenia); 
Bateson, Jackson, Haley & Wakeland, Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia, 1 BEHAV. Sc1. 251 
(1956) (same). See generally L. FESTINGER, supra note 56. Or, the hearer may consciously or 
unconsciously reinterpret the new story, in light of the hearer's own belief system and inventory 
of stock stories, so as to blunt, or even reverse its meaning. See id.; Winkler, Scholars Nourished 
on the 60's Question the Impact of Their Research on Public Policy and Law, Chron. Higher Ed., 
Nov. 9, 1988, at AS, col. 2 (Mary Frances Berry, professor of history and former Assistant 
Secretary of HEW, and other historians recounted cases where scholars' testimony to courts and 
Congress had an effect opposite from that intended because the decisionmaker had a different 
agenda, or reinterpreted scholar's account to favor the other side). 
88. Note the abstract, bloodless - not to mention ineffectual - quality of John Henry's 
legal complaint. Supra subsection l.C. l. It does little to challenge, enlighten or move us, as 
some of the other stories do. 
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ers rarely focus on their own mindsets, the received wisdoms that 
serve as their starting points, themselves no more than stories, that lie 
behind their quasi-scientific string of deductions. The supposedly ob-
jective point of view often mischaracterizes, minimizes, dismisses, or 
derides without fully understanding opposing viewpoints. Implying 
that objective, correct answers can be given to legal questions also ob-
scures the moral and political value judgments that lie at the heart of 
any legal inquiry. 
Legal storytelling is an engine built to hurl rocks over walls of so-
cial complacency that obscure the view out from the citadel. But the 
rocks all have messages tied to them that the defenders cannot help 
but read. The messages say, let us knock down the walls, and use the 
blocks to pave a road we can all walk together. 89 
89. HOW THINGS CAME OUT 
The curious reader will be glad to know that: 
Professor White never modified his view. 
Al-Hammar X graduated in the top 15% of his class, enrolled in a famous LL.M. program, 
and plans to become a law professor. 
Judith Rogers continued to be friendly with Professor Vernier, and actually succeeded in 
making him more receptive to minority candidates. 
John Henry was hired at Howard, where he had a long and illustrious career. 
The students at school X formed a committee to press for more minority and women profes-
sors. They did all the things Al-Hammar X suggested except disrupt classes. Two years later, 
the school hired two black women and a Hispanic male, maintaining however that this was not 
the result of student pressure but rather its own long-term recruiting. 
